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ATTORNEY DIRECT-MAIL
SOLICITATION REVISITED IN
FLORIDA BAR v. WENT FOR IT, INC.:*

A STEP TOO FAR
Israel Dahan**
Dear "Anonymous ":
It has come to our attention that you were recently injured
in an automobile accident. Under the law, you have the
right to fair compensation for all accident and injury
related costs. If you do not have a lawyer to help you at
this time of need, please feel free to give us a call.'
INTRODUCTION

The vast majority of low- and moderate-income families in
America avoid consulting an attorney even when they perceive a
need to do so.2 Numerous studies suggest that this behavior derives

115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
Brooklyn Law School class of 1997. The author wishes to thank Brooklyn
Law School Associate Dean Joel M. Gora for his guidance and invaluable
assistance in the preparation of this Comment. A special note of thanks to my
wife Melanie, for her love and continual support.
' This is a fictitious letter created by the author based on text from numerous
solicitation letter excerpts sent to Florida citizens and cited in Howard Pankratz,
Lawyers' Letter Angers Floridians Thirty Day Waiting Period Upheld by High
Court, DENVER POST, Aug. 11, 1995, at A12.
2 See Mark Hansen, A Shunned Justice System: Most Families Don't Turn
to Lawyers or Judges to Solve Legal Problems, Survey Says, 80 A.B.A. J. 18
(1994) (citing a 1992 survey conducted for the American Bar Association's

Consortium on Legal Services and the Public which found that "while about half
of all low and moderate income families in America have a legal need at any
given time, most of them never turn to the justice system for help"); see also

Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 370 (1977) (citing various surveys and
studies suggesting that members of American society are generally unaware of
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largely from their inability to locate a competent attorney to handle
their legal problem3 and their belief that they will be unable to
afford the attorney's services.' Direct-mail advertising,' such as
the sample letter provided above, helps remedy this problem by
informing the general public about their legal6 rights and claims and
by increasing their access to legal services.
Nearly two decades ago, the Supreme Court lifted the ban on
attorney advertising in Bates v State Bar of Arizona.7 The Court

where and how to obtain competent legal services and often fear the services will
not be affordable).
' Bates, 433 U.S. at 370; see also FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, STAFF
REP. ON IMPROVING CONSUMER ACCESS TO LEGAL SERVICES 1 (1984)
[hereinafter F.T.C. REP.]; Lori B. Andrews, The Model Rules and Advertising,
68 A.B.A. J. 808 (1982) (citing national survey conducted by Barbara A. Curran
finding 83% of those polled believe that people avoid contacting attorneys
because "they have no way of knowing which lawyers are competent to handle
their particular problems"); Thomas Sawaya, Willy Loman Joins the Bar, 76
A.B.A. J. 88 (1990) (citing findings of Curran survey).
4 Bates, 433 U.S. at 370; F.T.C. REP., supra note 3, at 1.
5 "Direct-mail advertising" is defined as "advertising sent unsolicited through
the post to prospective customers." NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 679 (4th ed. 1993).
6

See FINDINGS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 28 (1994)

[hereinafter COMPREHENSIVE NEEDS STUDY] (finding that 31% of low-income
households found an attorney through an advertisement or referral service); LORI
B. ANDREWS, BIRTH OF A SALESMAN: LAWYER ADVERTISING & SOLICITATION

85 (1980). Andrews argues that relaxing the rules on attorney advertising and
solicitation "helps the average citizen gain access to legal services," and reduces
the costs of attorney services by creating competition among lawyers. Id;
BARBARA A. CURRAN, ABA CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE
PUBLIC: Two NATIONWIDE SURVEYS: 1989 PILOT ASSESSMENT OF THE POOR

& PUBLIC GENERALLY 61 (1989) (reporting that relaxing the rules on attorney
advertising is one reason for the dramatic increase in the public's use of legal
services); ABA CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVICES: LAWYER ADVERTISING AT

THE CROSSROADS 136 (1995) [hereinafter LAWYER ADVERTISING AT THE
CROSSROADS] (commenting on how legal services "should be promulgated and
implemented for the purpose of serving the public's interest"). For a discussion
of the effect of targeted, direct-mail solicitation, see generally Nomi N. Zomick,
Attorney Solicitation of Clients: Proposed Solutions, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 755
(1979).
' 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (finding an Arizona disciplinary rule prohibiting
attorney advertising violative of the First Amendment right to free speech).
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declared that legal advertising was a form of commercial speech
protected by the First Amendment,8 and as such, "may not be
subjected to blanket suppression." 9 Since Bates, the Supreme Court
has continued to expand the rights of attorney advertising and has
found that the benefits to both the bar and the public outweigh the
possibility of deception."°
In 1988, the Court went one step further and finally clarified
the law regarding targeted, direct-mail solicitation by attorneys in
Shapero v Kentucky Bar Association." In Shapero, the Court held
that a state may not categorically prohibit targeted, direct-mail
solicitation by lawyers.' 2 In determining the propriety of a
particular direct-mail solicitation, the pertinent question "is not
whether there exist potential clients whose 'condition' makes them
susceptible to undue influence, but whether the mode of

8

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment is applicable to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 811 (1975) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment
makes the First Amendment binding on the states). "Commercial speech" has
been defined as an "expression related solely to the economic interest of the
speaker" and also as "speech proposing a commercial transaction." See Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62
(1980).
9 Bates, 433 U.S. at 383.
'0 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 646-47 (1985) (holding that courts cannot ban printed advertisements aimed at a specific audience if they are not false or misleading); In re
R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (holding that states cannot prohibit a lawyer
from advertising fields of practice if not false or misleading). But see Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 449 (1978) (holding that states may,
consistent with the First Amendment, impose a blanket prohibition against inperson solicitation).
" 486 U.S. 466 (1988). Prior to 1988, the Court did not address the issue
of whether the First Amendment protects direct-mail solicitation of clients known
to have a particular legal problem. See infra page 624-25.
12

Shapero, 486 U.S. at 473.
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communication poses a serious danger that lawyers will exploit any
such susceptibility."' 3 Most courts and commentators have interpreted Shapero as holding that the First Amendment protects all
forms of written communication if it is neither false nor mislead4
ing. 1

On June 21, 1995, despite nearly two decades of decisions
expanding the rights of attorneys who wish to advertise, the
Supreme Court changed direction and limited the rights of attorney
advertising in Florida Bar v Went For It, Inc. 5 In a five-to-four
decision, in an opinion authored by Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, 6 the Court upheld a Florida Bar rule 7 which

Id. at 474.
See, e.g., Peel v. Attorney Reg. & Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 496 U.S.
91, 106 (1990) (finding letterhead that made a bona fide claim of certification
by the National Board of Trial Advocacy was not misleading); Unnamed
Attorney v. Attorney Grievance Comm'n, 545 A.2d 685, 691 (Md. 1988)
(holding that solicitation letters sent by attorney to recently injured persons, some
as soon as the day after the injury, are protected by the First Amendment). For
a chronological history on commercial speech regulation, see generally Karl A.
Boedecker et al., The Evolution of FirstAmendment Protectionfor Commercial
Speech, 59 J. MKTG. 38 (1995); see also Robert D. Peltz, Legal
Advertising-OpeningPandora'sBox?, 19 STETSON L. REV. 43, 44-45 (1989)
(tracing judicial development of attorneys different advertising methods).
's 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
16 Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence
Thomas and Stephen Breyer joined Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's majority
opinion. Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsberg
joined Justice Anthony Kennedy's dissenting opinion.
17 In late 1990, the Florida Supreme Court approved a number of amendments to its rules regulating attorney advertising. See The Florida Bar: Petition
to Amend the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar-Advertising Issues, 571 So.2d
451, 452 (Fla. 1990). Two of these amendments, Rule 4-7.4(b)(1) and Rule 47.8(a), were at issue in Went For It. See infra note 83 and accompanying text
(providing Rule 4-7.4(b)(1) and Rule 4-7.8(a)).
Plaintiffs Stewart McHenry and a referral service, Went For It, Inc., filed
an action challenging Rules 4-7.4(b)(1) and 4-7.8(a) as a violation of their First
Amendment right to free speech. See McHenry v. Florida Bar, 808 F. Supp. 1543
(M.D. Fla. 1992). Both the district court and the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals found for the plaintiffs and ruled that the thirty-day prohibition of
targeted, direct-mail solicitation violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment right
of free speech. Id. at 1544; McHenry v. Florida Bar, 21 F.3d 1038, 1042 (11th
'3
'4

FLORIDA BAR v. WENT FOR IT, INC.
prohibited lawyers from sending targeted direct-mail solicitation to
accident victims and their loved ones within thirty days of the
accident.' 8 In reviewing the Florida law, the Court used the
intermediate scrutiny standard set forth in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v Public Service Commission, which requires
regulation of commercial speech to be narrowly tailored and to
directly advance a substantial government interest.20 Relying
heavily on the Florida Bar's two-year study on the effects of
lawyer advertising, 2 ' the Court found the thirty-day ban to be
reasonably well-tailored to its stated objective to protect the privacy
of personal injury victims against intrusive, unsolicited contact by
lawyers.22
Not only does the Court's ruling in Went For It depart from
previous rulings,23 it tends to favor lawyers in large firms and

Cir. 1994).
"8 Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2381.
'9 447 U.S. 557 (1980). In CentralHudson, a utility company challenged an
order of the New York Public Service Commission that banned any promotional
advertising that might tend to stimulate the use of electricity. Id. at 558-60. In
evaluating the Commission's order, the Court held that a regulation on commercial speech that does not concern unlawful activity and is not misleading is
permissible if the government "assert[s] a substantial interest" in support of its
regulation; establishes that the restriction directly and materially advances that
interest; and demonstrates that the regulation is "narrowly drawn." Id. at 564-65.
See infra note 46 (discussing the application of this test in Central Hudson).
20 Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2376.
2 Id. at 2377. Justice O'Connor states that the Florida Bar's study,
noteworthy for its breadth and detail, "contains data-both statistical and
anecdotal supporting the Bar's contentions that the Florida public views directmail solicitations in the immediate wake of accidents as an intrusion on their
privacy that reflects poorly upon the profession." Id.
22 Id. at 2381.
23 See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 473-74 (1988)
(holding that commercial speech cannot be restricted merely because the
government feels some may find the speech offensive); Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 648 (1985)
(holding that because some may find speech offensive, its suppression is not
justified); Bolger v. Young Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 (1983) (holding
suppression of speech is not justified merely because some may find it
offensive); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
573-75 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (arguing that absent coercion,
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lawyers who can afford to spend money on other forms of
expensive advertising.24 Small firms and solo practitioners who
rely on direct-mail solicitation as a means of procuring clients, will
no doubt be most harmed by rules regulating targeted, direct-mail
solicitation. These lawyers lack the reputation, connection, or
funds that allow more established firms and lawyers to attract
clients without direct-mail advertising.26
Furthermore, placing regulations on lawyer advertising, such as
a thirty-day ban, will have a negative impact on the general
public. 27 Recent studies indicate that legal advertising aids the

deception, or misinformation, a state should not be able to prohibit speech simply
because of the persuasive effect the message may have on the public). But see.
Edenfeld v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993) (holding that a person's privacy "is
a substantial state interest" for purpose of the Central Hudson test); Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 460-62 (1978) (concluding that the bar's
interest in protecting the lay public from in-person attorney solicitation justified
regulation).
24 See Louise L. Hill, A Lawyer's Pecuniary Gain: The Enigma of
Impermissible Solicitation, 5 GEO. I. LEGAL ETHICs 393, 418-19 (1991) (noting
that regulations on direct-mail solicitation mostly impacts lawyers in small law
firms and solo practitioners who rely heavily on direct-mail solicitation as
opposed to television and newspaper advertisements, as a source of attracting
clients); Katherine A. Laroe, Much Ado About Barratry: State Regulation of
Attorneys' Targeted Direct-MailSolicitation, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1513, 1544
(1994) (reporting that regulating targeted, direct solicitation mostly affects
lawyers in "small firms, young firms and solo practitioners," for they cannot
afford other sources of advertising, such as television and newspaper advertisements).
25 Al H. Ringleb et al., Lawyer Direct-Mail Advertisements: Regulating
Environment, Economics and Consumer Perceptions, 17 PAC. L.J. 1199, 1235
n.238 (1986) (citing a 1980 study which indicates that most lawyers who rely on
direct-mail solicitation as a means of procuring clients are younger and in small
firms or solo practitioners).
26 See Laroe, supra note 24, at 1544.
27 See COMPREHENSIVE NEEDS STUDY, supra note 6, at 28 (reporting that
over 25% of low-income households rely on advertisements or referral services
to find an attorney); see also ANDREWS, supra note 6, at 79-80 (stating that
advertising helps the public gain access to legal services and reduces cost of legal
services); LAWYER ADVERTISING AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 6, at 129-30,
136-38 (discussing how legal advertising benefits the public by helping the
average citizen gain access to legal services).
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general public by making it more aware of legal issues and the
availability of legal services. 28 When done tastefully and professionally, legal advertising provides a practical service to people in
search of an attorney.
Part I of this Comment will explore the impact that the First
Amendment has had on the history of attorney advertising and
solicitation, with particular emphasis on its impact on direct-mail
solicitation. Part II will review the factual background and the
majority and dissenting opinions in FloridaBar v Went ForIt, Inc.
Lastly, part III of this Comment will analyze the legal and socioeconomic impact of this decision on attorneys who wish to
advertise and on the general public's access to legal services.
I.

EVOLUTION OF ATTORNEY ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION

In 1977, the United States Supreme Court for the first time
extended First Amendment commercial speech protection to
attorney advertising in Bates v State Bar of Arizona.29 In Bates,

2"

For commentary on how legal advertising benefits the community, see

ANDREWS, supra note 6, at 85; COMPREHENSIVE NEEDS STUDY, supra note 6,

at 28; CURRAN, supra note 6 at 61; Sawaya, supra note 3, at 88 (reporting on
how legal advertising benefits the public).
29 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977) (holding that lawyer advertising is a form of
commercial speech that "may not be subject to blanket suppression").
First Amendment protection for commercial speech in general has only
recently been recognized by the courts. Prior to 1976, the courts followed the
rule established in Valentine v. Chrestensen,that, although the First Amendment
prevents government restriction of speech in most cases, the Constitution
mandates no such governmental protection to commercial advertising. 316 U.S.
52, 54 (1942). Valentine involved the distribution of handbills which advertised
tours on a retired United States Navy submarine. Id. at 53. The distribution of
the handbills violated section 318 of the New York City's Sanitation Code,
"which forbids distribution in the street of commercial and business advertising
matter." Id. at 53. To circumvent the code, the distributor printed public interest
information on the back of the handbills. Id. The Court held that the commercial
message printed on one side of the handbills could not acquire constitutional
protection by virtue of the public information printed on the other side. Id. at 5455; see also Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (reaffirming Valentine's
restrictive view towards the First Amendment protection of commercial speech).
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two lawyers advertised their services and fees in a daily newspaper
in violation of an Arizona disciplinary rule which prohibited
attorney advertising.30 Following a complaint and a hearing before
the Special Administrative Committee of the Arizona State Bar
Association, the Board of Governors suspended each lawyer from
the practice of law for one week.3"

In 1976, the Supreme Court extended First Amendment protection to
commercial advertising. In VirginiaState BoardofPharmacyv. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), the Court struck down a Virginia
statute which banned pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices. Id
at 776 (1976). Finding that pharmacists have a constitutional right to advertise
"I will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price," the Court rejected the
state's argument that such speech "is so removed from 'any exposition of ideas,'
and from 'truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal
sentiments on the administration of Government,' that it lacks all protection." Id.
at 762. Chief Justice Warren Berger cautioned, however, that the majority's
holding applied only to restrictions on the professional advertisement of
consumer goods, a type of commercial speech that was distinguished from the
advertising of professional services. Id. at 774 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The
majority recognized that advertising by professionals, including physicians and
lawyers, may pose different constitutional questions, and therefore reserved
judgment on the regulation of these professions. Id. at 773 n.25.
30 Bates, 433 U.S. at 354-55. The Arizona rule governing attorney
advertising provides, in pertinent part:
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or
any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through
newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio or television announcements, display advertisements in the city or telephone directories or
other means of commercial publicity, nor shall he authorize or permit
others to do so in his behalf.
Id. at 355 (quoting ARIZONA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2101(B) (1976)). The advertisement stated that the Legal Clinic of Bates &
O'Steen were "offering 'legal services at very reasonable fees,' and listed their
fees for certain services." Id. at 354. For an actual picture of the advertisement
at issue in Bates, see ANDREWS supra note 6, at 89.
31 Bates, 433 U.S. at 356. At the hearing before the Special Local
Administrative Committee, the three member committee recommended the
suspension of each lawyer for a minimum of six months. Id. Upon further
review, the Board of Governors suggested that each lawyer be suspended for one
week. Id. Prior to the imposition of the sanction and pursuant to Arizona
Supreme Court Rule 37, the matter was transferred to the Supreme Court of
Arizona, which reduced the penalty to a "censure." Id. at 358. The Court
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Before the U.S. Supreme Court, the lawyers argued that their
advertisements were protected commercial speech and that
Arizona's disciplinary rule prohibiting attorney advertising violated
their First Amendment right to free speech.32 The State Bar of
Arizona, on the other hand, advanced a number of justifications for
its prohibition, each of them rejected by the Supreme Court.33 The
State Bar claimed, for example, that price advertising would have
an "adverse effect on professionalism,"34 in part by commercializing the practice of law and thereby undermining the notability
and value of the legal profession.35 In dismissing this argument,
the Court found that the "postulated connection between advertising
36
and the erosion of true professionalism to be severely strained.
The Court noted that clients expect attorneys to charge for their
services and that price information might encourage some potential
clients to seek legal advice.37
The Arizona Bar also argued that the alternatives to a total ban
on attorney advertising caused problems of enforcement.3" Due to
the number of lawyers, the public's lack of education with regard

reasoned that although the attorneys deliberately violated the Arizona disciplinary
rules, they did so "in good faith to test the constitutionality of DR 2-101(B)."
Id.; see supra note 30 (providing Rule DR 2-101(B)).
"Censure" is defined as "the formal resolution of a legislative, administrative, or other body reprimanding a person, normally one of its own members,
for specified conduct." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 224 (6th ed. 1990).
32 Bates, 433 U.S. at 363.
33 Id. at 368-79. In justifying the ban, the state bar argued that attorney
advertising: (1) adversely affects professionalism; (2) is inherently misleading in
nature; (3) would tend to stir up litigation; (4) would ultimately lead to an
increase in attorneys' fees; (5) adversely affects the quality of legal services; and
(6) is too difficult to regulate with anything other than a complete ban. Id.
34 Id. at 368-72.
31 Id. at 368. The Court summarized the bar's argument: "The key to
professionalism, it is argued, is the sense of pride that involvement in the
discipline demonstrates. It is claimed that price advertising will bring about
commercialization,which will undermine the attorney's sense of dignity and selfworth." Id.
36
37
38

Id. at 368.
Id. at 370.
Id.
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to legal matters and the potential for overreaching,39 overseeing
attorney advertising would be too burdensome. 40 The Court
rejected this argument as well, noting that:
It is at least somewhat incongruous for the opponents of
advertising to extol the virtues and altruism of the legal
profession at one point, and, at another, to assert that its
members will seize the opportunity to mislead and distort.
We suspect that with advertising, most lawyers will behave
as they always have: They will abide by their solemn oaths
to uphold the integrity and honor of their profession and of
the legal system.4
The Court, therefore, held that because attorney advertising is a
form of protected commercial speech, a state may not place a
blanket suppression on attorney advertising which is neither false
nor deceptive."
Nearly two decades of cases have built upon the foundation laid
out in Bates, and it is now well established that lawyer advertising
is commercial speech and, as such, is accorded a measure of First
Amendment protection. 43 First Amendment protection of

" "Overreaching," "in connection with commercial and consumer transactions," is defined as "that which results from an inequality of bargaining power
or other circumstances in which there is an absence of meaningful choice on the
part of one of the parties." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1104 (6th ed. 1990). In
addition, overreaching has been described as "one party, by artifice or by
cunning, or significant disparity to understand the nature of the transaction, to
outwit or cheat the other." Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500, 506 (Ohio 1984).
It has also been described as "tricking, outwitting, or cheating a person into
doing an act which he would not otherwise have done." B.A.L. v. Edna Gladney
Home, 677 S.W.2d 826, 831 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). Overreaching "is in a general
way synonymous with fraud," but "its connotation is perhaps even broader."
Browning v. Nesting, 219 S.W.2d 712, 718 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
40

Bates, 433 U.S. at 379.

41

Id.

42

Id.at 383.

43 See,

e.g., Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill.,
496 U.S. 91, 110 (1990); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n., 486 U.S. 466, 480
(1988); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio,
471 U.S. 626, 646-47 (1985); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982). But see
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 449 (1978). For an overview of
how various states revised their rules after the Bates decision, see Roger P.

FLORIDA BAR v. WENT FOR IT, INC.
commercial speech, however, is limited. "'[c]ommercial speech
enjoys a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its
subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values, and
is subject to modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the
realm of noncommercial expression."' 44
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v Public Service
Commission,45 the Supreme Court formulated the following fourpart test for determining the constitutionality of a restriction on
commercial speech:
(1) The speech must not be misleading and it must concern
lawful activity;
(2) the asserted state interest promoted by the restriction
must be substantial;
(3) the restriction must directly advance the asserted state
interest; and
(4) the restriction must not be more extensive than neces46
sary to serve the asserted state interest.

Brosnahan & Lori B. Andrews, Regulations ofLawyer Advertising: In the Public
Interest?, 46 BROOK. L. REv. 423, 426-34 (1980).
44 Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477
(1989) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)). In
Fox, the Court observed that "' [t]o require a parity of constitutional protection
for commercial and non-commercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply
by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment's guarantee with respect
to the latter kind of speech."' Id.at 481 (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456).
4'447 U.S. 557 (1980). In CentralHudson, a utility company challenged an
order of the New York Public Service Commission that banned any promotional
advertising that might tend to stimulate the use of electricity. Id.at 558-60.
46 Id. at 566. Regarding the first prong of the four-part test, the Court in
CentralHudson stated that while the government may totally suppress misleading
or deceptive advertising and commercial speech related to illegal activity, all
commercial speech that is not misleading, deceptive or related to unlawful
activity is constitutionally protected and therefore subject to a more circumscribed governmental power. Id.at 563-64. The Court noted that the Commission
had not alleged that the advertising was misleading or that it involved unlawful
activity. Id.at 566. In applying the second part of the test, the Court found that
the Commission's asserted interest in promoting energy conservation and
ensuring fair and efficient utility rates was substantial to justify the restriction on
advertising. Id.at 568-69. In addressing the third part of the test, the Court found
that although the argument concerning the effect of advertising on utility rates
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The Court later modified the fourth part of the test to require only
a "reasonable fit" between the asserted state interest and the
restriction on commercial speech.47
The Court applied the Central Hudson test for the first time in
the context of attorney advertising in the case of In re R.MJ. 48 In

was "at most, tenuous" and "highly speculative," the ban on the advertisements
did directly advancethe Commission's interest of energy conservation. Id.at 569.
However, the Court found that the Commission's prohibition violated the First
Amendment because it failed to show that a more limited speech regulation
would not protect the state's interest. Id.at 570. The rule, therefore, failed under
the fourth prong, the "least restrictive means" test, because all advertising was
restricted without any showing that a more limited restriction would not
adequately further the state's interest in energy conservation. Id.at 569-71.
In Central Hudson, Justice Harry Blackmun denounced the four-part test
implemented by the majority as inconsistent with prior cases and as lacking
adequate First Amendment protection for truthful, nondeceptive commercial
speech. Id.at 573 (Blackmun, J.,concurring). Justice Blackmun contended that
absent coercion, deception, or misinformation, a state should not be able to
prohibit speech simply because of the persuasive effect the message may have
on the public. Id. at 573-75 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Thus, Justice Blackmun
argued, that even given the importance of energy conservation, suppression of
speech was an impermissible way to achieve such a goal. Id.at 574 (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
For further discussion on CentralHudson and its application, see Joanne G.
Caldwell, Recent Development: Legal Ethics-LawyerAdvertising-Advertising
That Is Not Misleading May Not Be Proscribed,50 TENN. L. REV. 175, 188
(1982); Evan R. Levy, Edenfeld v. Fane: In-PersonSolicitationBy Professionals
Revisited-What Makes Lawyers Different, 58 ALB. L. REv. 261, 262 (1994).
41 Fox, 492 U.S. at 480. The Court held that "not more extensive than
necessary," simply requires "a'fit' between the legislature's ends and the means
chosen to accomplish those ends-a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but
reasonable." Id.; see infra note 115 (discussing Fox). For an in-depth analysis of
Fox, see Todd J. Lochner, Comment, Board of Trustees of the State University
of New York v. Fox: Cutting Back on Commercial Speech Standards, 75 IOWA
L. REv. 1335 (1990).
41 In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982). At issue in R.MJ. was the
Missouri
Supreme Court Rule 4 which allowed attorneys to place printed advertisements
in "newspapers, periodicals and the yellow pages of telephone directories." Id.
at 194. Ten categories of information could be included: "name, address and
telephone number; areas of practice; date and place of birth; schools attended;
foreign language ability; office hours fee for initial consultation; availability of
a schedule of fees; credit arrangements; and the fixed fee to be charged for
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R.M.J., the Court struck down a Missouri rule that prohibited
attorneys from mailing professional announcement cards to anyone
"other than lawyers, clients, former clients, personal friends and
relatives."49 The lawyer in R.MJ. had mailed cards that announced the opening of his new office to people who were not within
the rule's permissible group of recipients.50 The Supreme Court
concluded that because there existed less restrictive means of
regulating general mailings by attorneys, such as requiring the
filing "of a copy of all general mailings" with the state bar, the rule
violated the First Amendment.5
Four years later in Zauderer v Office of Disciplinary Council
of the Supreme Court of Ohio,52 the Supreme Court held that a

certain specified 'routine' legal services." Id. Rule 4, DR 2-102(A)(2) also stated
that announcement cards could only be sent to "'lawyers, clients, former clients,
personal friends and relatives."' Id.at 196 (quoting Mo. Rev. Stat., Sup. Ct. R.
4, DR 2-102(A)(2) (1978)).
49 R.MJ., 455 U.S. at 206-07. The lawyer also challenged the constitutionality of the other provisions of the Missouri Rule 4, such as the one restricting
lawyer advertising to certain categories of information and, in some instances,
to certain specified language. Id.at 194-95. The Supreme Court also found these
rules to be an unconstitutional restriction on free speech. Id. at 205-06.
" Id.at 198. The permissible group of recipients are only "lawyers, clients,
former clients, personal friends and relatives." Id. at 206-07. The advertisement
was displayed in the January, February and August 1978 yellow pages. Id.at
196-97. The advertisement indicated that the lawyer "was licensed in Missouri
and Illinois" and that he was "Admitted to Practice Before THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT." Id.at 197. Additionally, he listed practice areas
not addressed in the rule, such as "contract," "aviation," "securities-bonds,"
"pension and profit sharing plans," "zoning and land use," "entertainment/sports,"
"food, drug and cosmetics" and "communication." Id.at 197 n.8.
51 Id. at 206. For a more detailed analysis of In re R.MJ and its possible
implications, see Audrey Shields, Attorney's ExpandingRight to Advertise Under
the FirstAmendment: In Re R.M.J., 26 How. L.J. 281, 295-303 (1983).
12 471 U.S. 626 (1985). In Zauderer,the appellant, an Ohio attorney, placed
an advertisement in the local newspaper which contained a drawing of a contraceptive device referred to as the Dalkon Shield Intrauterine Device ("IUD"). Id.
at 630. The advertisement described alleged problems caused by the IUD and
offered legal advice to the reader. Id.at 631. The advertisement also advised the
reader that the firm was currently representing women in suits concerning "the
IUD" on a contingent-fee basis. Id.Subsequently, the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel "filed a complaint against the [attorney] charging him with a number of
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state's disciplinary rule which prohibited the use of illustrations in
attorney advertising unconstitutionally restricted attorneys' free
speech right.53 The Court reasoned that a state may restrict
commercial speech only in the wake of a governmental interest and
by means that advance that interest. 4 The Court found the state's
interests in preserving the dignity of the legal profession and in
avoiding the risk that the public might be misled or manipulated
insufficient to justify the total ban on the use of illustrations in
advertisements, and deemed the rule unconstitutional.5
The Court's decisions in Bates, R.MJ. and Zauderer collectively establish that states cannot place blanket prohibitions on the
following types of advertising by attorneys: advertising the cost of
legal services in the print media;56 advertising an accurate listing
of the attorney's areas of practice, either through general mailings,
announcements to specific targeted groups, newspaper ads, or
telephone listings;57 and advising target portions of the public of
their rights to pursue particular types of cases.58 These decisions,

disciplinary violations arising out of [the advertisement]." Id.
The complaint also alleged that the IUD advertisement violated DR 2-

10 1(B) which prohibited the use of illustrations in advertisements. Id.
at 632 n.4.
After a hearing before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline

of the Supreme Court of Ohio, the Board concluded that the advertisements
violated the rules and recommended disciplinary action. Id.at 634-36. On review,
the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the Board's findings and issued a public

reprimand. Id.at 636.
A "public reprimand" is defined as "a public or formal censure or severe
reproof, administered to a person in fault by his superior officer or by a body or

organization to which he belongs." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1302 (6th ed.
1990).
5 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 639-49.
s Id.
at 638. The Court held that the reprimand related to the attorney's use
of an illustration in his advertisement, violated the First Amendment. Id.
at 64749. The Court reasoned that, "commercial speech that is not false or deceptive
and does not concern unlawful activities... may be restricted only in the service
of a substantial governmental interest, and only through means that directly
advance that interest." Id at 638
" Id.at 647-48.
56 Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977).
17

58

In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 204-07 (1982).

Zauderer, 471 U.S. 626, 639-48 (1985). But see Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
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however left unresolved a significant issue in the area of attorney
direct-mail solicitation: whether the First Amendment protects
direct-mail solicitation of clients known to have a particular legal
problem. The Supreme Court answered this important question in
Shapero v Kentucky Bar Association.59
In Shapero, the Court held that a Kentucky Supreme Court
Rule 60 which prohibited targeted, direct-mail solicitation by
attorneys for monetary gain violated the First Amendment.61
Richard Shapero applied to the Kentucky Attorneys Advertising
Commission 62 and the Kentucky State Bar Association's
Committee on Legal Ethics for approval of a correspondence he
wished to send to recent victims of foreclosure. 63 Although neither

Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 449 (1978) (holding that states may place regulations on
in-person solicitation).
'9 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
60 The Kentucky State Supreme Court Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i)
provided that:
A written advertisement may be sent or delivered to an individual
addressee only if that addressee is one of a class of persons, other than
a family, to whom it is also sent or delivered at or about the same
time, and only if it is not prompted or precipitated by a specific event
or occurrence involving or relating to the addressee or addressees as
distinct from the general public.
Shapero, 486 U.S. at 470 n.2 (quoting Ky. Sup. Ct. R. 3.1356(5)(b)(i) (1988)).
61

Id. at 468, 480.

62

The responsibilities of Kentucky'sAdvertising Commission are as follows:

The Attorneys Advertising Commission is charged with the responsibility of "regulating attorney advertising as prescribed" in the Rules of
the Kentucky Supreme Court. . . . The Commission's decisions are
applicable to the Board of Governors of the Supreme Court .... "Any
attorney who is in doubt as to the propriety of any professional act
contemplated by him" also has the option of seeking an advisory
opinion from a committee of the Kentucky Bar Association, which, if
formally adopted by the Board of Governors, is reviewable by the
Kentucky Supreme Court.
Id. at 469 n.1. (citing Ky. Sup. Ct. R. 3.135(3) and R. 3.135(8), respectively).
63 Id. at 469. In Shapero, the proposed letter
read as follows:
It has come to my attention that your home is being foreclosed on. If
this is true, you may be about to lose your home. Federal law may
allow you to keep your home by ORDERING your creditors to STOP
and give you more time to pay them. You may call my office anytime
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the Advertising Commission nor the Ethics Committee found
Shapero's proposed letter false or misleading, they both objected to
the letter.64 On review, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the

from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for FREE information on how you can
keep your home. Call NOW; don't wait. It may surprise you what I
may be able to do for you. Just call and tell me that you got this letter.
Remember it is FREE; there is NO charge for calling.
Id.; see Marcia Coyle, Will Another Lawyer Ad Taboo Fall? High Court to
Consider Mail Ban, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 29, 1988, at 3 (previewing the Shapero
case and quoting Richard Shapero, the lawyer who wanted to send the targeted
solicitation); see also Marcia Coyle, Was Direct-Mailthe Last Taboo? Revisions
Necessary On Ad Bans, NAT'L L.J., June 27, 1988, at 3 [hereinafter The Last
Taboo]. In addition to summarizing the Court's decision in Shapero, this article
reports the reaction of various attorneys and Ethics Committees to the decision.
For example, the article cites Peter Moshes, an attorney and Ethics Committee
Chairman who predicts the Court's decision will promote increased litigation in
states trying to form regulations or restrictions on attorney advertising in
accordance with Shapero. Id. On the other hand, the article also cites Mr.
Johnson of the American Bar Association who predicts that Shapero will not
have a significant impact on the states nor the public. Id. Mr. Johnson reasons
that most states that have already permitted targeted, direct-mail solicitation have
experienced very few ethical complaints regarding the solicitation. Id.
4 Shapero, 486 U.S. at 469-70. The Advertising Commission based its
decision upon Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i) which prohibited the dissemination of "written
advertisements 'precipitated by a specific event or occurrence involving or
relating to the addressee or addressees as distinct from the general public."' Id.
(quoting Ky. Sup. Ct. R. 3.135(5)(b)(i) (1988)). Despite its decision, the
Advertising Commission expressed the opinion that the Kentucky rule conflicted
with the First Amendment and was unconstitutional based on the U.S. Supreme
Court's holding in Zauderer. Id.at 470; Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 646-47 (1985). As a
result, the Kentucky Supreme Court replaced Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i) with Rule 7.3
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 470. Model
Rule 7.3 provides:
A lawyer may not solicit professional employment from a prospective
client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional
relationship, by mail, in-person or otherwise, when a significant motive
for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain. The term
"solicit" includes contact in-person, by telephone or telegraph, by letter
or other writing, or by other communication directed to a specific
recipient, but does not include letters addressed or advertising
circulares distributed generally to persons not known to need legal
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65 and
Advertising Commission's rejection of the proposed letter,
66
Shapero appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
Before the Supreme Court, the Kentucky Bar Association
argued that the Court should follow the state supreme court's ruling
which upheld the ban against targeted, direct-mail solicitation
because the Shapero case was nothing more than "Ohralik in
writing. 67 Rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court

services of the kind provided by the lawyer in the particular matter, but
who are so situated that they might in general find such services
useful.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 7.3 (1984) (amended 1989).
Kentucky's adoption of Model Rule 7.3 did not change the status of Shapero's
letter, however, because Model Rule 7.3, like Kentucky's prior rule, prohibited
direct-mail solicitation. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 471; see also John T. Ballantine,
Jr., Comment, After Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association: Much Remains
Unresolvedabout the Allowable Limits of Restrictions on Attorney Advertising,
61 U. COLO. L. REV. 115, 131 (1990) (analyzing Shapero decision and the
replacement of Kentucky Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i) with Model Rule 7.3).
65 Shapero, 486 U.S. at 471.
66

id.

Id. at 475 (referring to Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447
(1978)). In Ohralik, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a state
prohibition on in-person solicitation violated an attorney's First Amendment free
speech right. Ohralik,436 U.S. at 449. Albert Ohralik, an attorney, had solicited
the business of two automobile accident victims while they were hospitalized. Id.
at 450. Both victims initially agreed to Ohralik's representation, but eventually
discharged him as their attorney and filed a complaint with the local bar
grievance committee. Id. at 453. As a result, the Ohio State Bar filed a complaint
with the Ohio Supreme Court Disciplinary Board claiming that Ohralik violated
the Ohio statutory rules forbidding in-person solicitation. Id. at 452-53. Rule DR
2-103(A) of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
A lawyer shall not recommend employment, as a private practitioner,
of himself, his partner, or associate to a non-lawyer who has not
sought his advice regarding employment as a lawyer.
Id. at 453 (citing OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(A)
(1970)). The Disciplinary Board found that Ohralik had violated Rule DR 2103(a) and recommended to the Ohio Supreme Court that Ohralik be issued a
public reprimand. Id. at 453-54. The Ohio Supreme Court adopted the Board's
findings and ordered that Ohralik be suspended indefinitely. Id. Ohralik appealed
to the United States Supreme Court, claiming that Ohio's statutory rule DR 2103(A) violated his First Amendment right to commercial speech. Id. at 454.
67
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distinguished targeted, direct-mail solicitation from the type of inperson solicitation that the Court had permitted states to ban in
Ohralik.68 First, the Court noted that in-person communication
was "'rife with possibilities for overreaching, invasion of privacy,
the exercise of undue influence and outright fraud. ,, 69 Second, the
Court reasoned that because in-person solicitation was not "open to
public scrutiny," enforcement of any regulation short of a total bar
would be impossible.7" As the Court did not find either of these
potential problems present in targeted, direct-mail solicitation, it
concluded that direct-mail solicitation "'poses much less risk of
overreaching or undue influence' than does in-person

Before the Supreme Court, Ohralik contended that in-person solicitation of
clients was indistinguishable from the advertising the Court had approved in
Bates. Id. at 455. Ohralik argued that the function of the advertising in Bates was
similar to the function of his solicitation because he had done no more than
inform potential clients of their legal rights and his availability to represent them.
Id. The Ohio State Bar, on the other hand, contended that it had a substantial
state interest in protecting consumers, regulating commercial transactions and
protecting professionalism. Id. at 460. Furthermore, the state argued that these
interests were protected by restricting in-person solicitation by attorneys. Id.
In agreeing with the State Bar's arguments, the Court upheld Ohralik's
sanction and reasoned that the in-person solicitation of clients poses a significant
public harm that does not exist in other forms of public advertising. Id. at 46466. The Court stated that unlike public advertisements, attorneys who solicit inperson apply pressure which "encourage[s] speedy and perhaps uninformed
decision making." Id. at 457. The Court also acknowledged that the state had a
substantial interest in preventing "fraud, undue influence, intimidation,
overreaching and other forms of 'vexatious conduct"' that may occur when a
client is personally solicited. Id. at 462. The Court concluded that a state statute
which restricts an attorney's use of in-person solicitation as a means of procuring
clients is not a violation of the attorney's constitutional right to commercial
speech. Id. at 467.
61 Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475; see Ballentine, supra note 64, at
132
(discussing the Shapero court's distinction between targeted direct-mail
solicitation and in-person solicitation); The Last Taboo, supra note 63, at 3
(reporting the Court's rejection of the similarity of dangers involved in-person
solicitation and targeted, direct-mail solicitation).
69 Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Council of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 641 (1985)).
70 Id.
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solicitation."'" Direct-mail solicitation, in the Court's view, did
not involve "'the coercive force of the personal presence of a
trained advocate' or the 'pressure on the potential client for an
immediate yes or no answer. '72
The Supreme Court also dismissed the Kentucky Supreme
Court's conclusion that a ban on targeted, direct-mail solicitation
was justified because an individual might become "overwhelmed"
by his or her legal dilemma and will consequently be unable to
exercise "good judgment."73 The Court noted:
The relevant inquiry is not whether there exists potential
clients whose "condition" makes them susceptible to undue
influence, but whether the mode of communication poses
a serious danger that lawyers will exploit any such susceptibility.... In assessing the potential for overreaching and
undue influence, the mode of communication makes all the
difference.74
Thus, the Court held that because targeted, direct-mail solicitation
was not a type of communication through which lawyers could
easily exploit clients that may be more susceptible to undue
influence, if truthful and not misleading, it was protected by the
First Amendment.75 Many courts interpret Shapero to stand for the
principle that all types of direct-mail solicitation enjoy First
Amendment protection, regardless of the recipient's condition or

"' Id. (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642); Thomas Morgan, Commercial
Interruptions, LEGAL TIMEs, Aug. 29, 1988, at S20 (reporting the Supreme
Court's rejection of state arguments that targeted direct-mail solicitation might
"unfairly overwhelm" the desires of the recipients).
72 Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475-76. The Court observed that the nature
of
written communications is fundamentally different than face-to-face encounters,
and commented that: "A letter, like a printed advertisement (but unlike a lawyer)
can readily be put in a drawer to be considered later, ignored or discarded." Id.
at 475-76; see also Fred Strasser & Marcia Coyle, Ad Ban, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 14,
1988, at 5 (reporting that during oral argument Shapero's attorney stated that
"[i]t's a lot easier to throw out a letter than a 250-pound lawyer in your living
room").
" Bates, 486 U.S. at 474.
14 Id. at 474-75.
7'

Id at 479.
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vulnerability, as long as the mailing is not false, misleading or
76

overreaching.

II. FLORIDA BAR V. WENT FOR IT, INC.
In Florida Bar v Went For It, Inc.,77 the Supreme Court
limited the First Amendment protection afforded to attorneys in
Shapero,7s by upholding a Florida Bar rule which bars attorneys
and attorney referral services from sending targeted, direct-mail
solicitations to accident victims or their families within thirty days
of the accident. 79 This section will review the factual background
of Went For It, and describe in great detail both the majority and
dissenting opinions given in this case.
A. Facts
Based on the results of a two-year survey on the effect of
lawyer advertising, s° in 1989 the Florida Bar decided that its
advertising rules required several changes. 8 ' The following year,
the Florida Bar offered before the Florida Supreme Court a list of
amendments it wished to make to its rules regulating attorney
advertising. 2 Two of these amendments were at issue in Went For

76

See, e.g., Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill.,

496 U.S. 91, 106 (1990) (holding that a letterhead making a bona fide claim as
to the lawyer's certification was not misleading); Unnamed Attorney v. Attorney
Grievance Comm'n, 545 A.2d 685, 691 (Md. 1988) (holding that solicitation
letters sent by attorney to recently injured persons, some as soon as the day after
the injury, are protected by the First Amendment). But see Edenfeld v. Fane, 507
U.S. 761, 768 (1993) (finding that protection of a potential client's privacy was
indeed a substantial state interest for purposes of the Central Hudson test).
" 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
7"486 U.S. 466 (1988) (holding that a state statute prohibiting targeted,
direct-mail solicitation by attorneys was unconstitutional).
79 Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2381. See infra note 83 and accompanying text
(describing the Florida Bar rules at issue in Went For It).
0 See infra note 103 (discussing results of the Florida study).
8' See The Florida Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Florida
Bar-Advertising Issues, 571 So. 2d 451, 452 (Fla. 1990).
82 Id.
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It.83 Together these two amendments created a thirty-day blackout
period in which lawyers may not, directly or indirectly, single out
accident victims or their relatives in order to solicit business.
In March 1992, Stewart McHenry84 and a referral service,
Went For It, Inc., filed an action in the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida challenging Rules 4-7.4(b)(1) and
4-7.8(a), as a violation of their First Amendment right to free
speech. 5 They argued that they frequently sent direct-mail
solicitations to accident victims or their loved ones within thirty
days of the accidents and that they desired to continue this
practice. The district court, relying on Bates v State Bar of

83 Rule

4-7.4 of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar provides in pertinent

part:
(b) Written Communication.
(1) A lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to be sent, on behalf
of himself, his firm, his partner, an associate, or any other lawyer
affiliated with him or his firm, a written communication to a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment if:
(a) The written communication concerns an action for personal injury
or wrongful death or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster
involving the person to whom the communication is addressed or a
relative of that person, unless the accident or disaster occurred more
than thirty days prior to the mailing of the communication.
See The Florida Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Florida
Bar-Advertising Issues, 571 So.2d at 466.
Rule 4-7.8 of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar provides in pertinent
part:
(a) When Lawyers May Accept Referrals. A lawyer shall not accept
referrals from a lawyer referral service unless the service: (1) engages
in no communication with the public and in no direct contact with
prospective clients in a manner that would violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct if the communication or contact were made by
the lawyer.
Id. at 471.
84 In October 1992, Stewart McHenry was disbarred. John T. Blakely
replacedMcHenry in the suit. McHenry v. Florida Bar, 21 F.3d 1038, 1040 (1 lth
Cir. 1994) (citing Florida Bar v. McHenry, 605 So.2d 459 (Fla. 1992)).
85 McHenry v. Florida Bar, 808 F. Supp. 1543, 1545 (M.D. Fla. 1992).
86 Id. at 1544 n.1; McHenry, 21 F.3d at 1040.
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Arizona,87 ruled that the thirty-day prohibition of targeted directmail solicitation violated the First Amendment and entered
summary judgment for the plaintiff.8 The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed for similar reasons.89 Troubled that Bates required this
outcome, the U.S. Supreme Court granted writ of certiorari.90
B. The Supreme Court Decision: Justice Sandra Day
0 'Connor Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's judgment,
holding that the Florida Bar's rule prohibiting lawyers from sending
direct-mail solicitation to accident victims or their loved ones
within thirty days of the accident did not violate a lawyer's First
Amendment right to free speech.9 ' In reviewing the constitutionality of the thirty-day ban, the Court used the four-prong test set
forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v Public Service
Commission,92 which requires regulation of commercial speech to

87

433 U.S. 350 (1977); see supra notes 31-43 and accompanying text

(discussing Bates).
88 McHenry, 808 F. Supp. at 1548. The district court concluded that:
The challenged rules substantially impair and impede the availability
of truthful and relevant information which can make a positive
contribution to consumers in need of legal services. This Court holds
that as a matter of law, the Florida Bar's thirty-day ban on personal
injury and wrongful death targeted direct mail lawyer advertising
violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Id.
89 McHenry, 21 F.3d at 1042. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding that neither of the bar's asserted state interests of protecting
traumatized individuals who are unable to make an "objective evaluation of a
personalized solicitation from a lawyer" nor safeguarding the personal privacy
of accident victims and their loved ones justified a thirty-day ban on "constitutionally protected direct mail advertising by attorneys." Id. at 1042.
90 The Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2375 (1995).
91Id. at 2381.
92 Id. at 2375-76; Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.

Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 560 (1980); see also supra note 46 and accompanying
text (discussing Central Hudson).

FLORIDA BAR v. WENT FOR IT, INC.
interest and to be
directly advance a substantial government
9 3
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
Finding the first part of the test had been satisfied because
neither party had alleged that the advertisement was false or
misleading,94 the Court proceeded to satisfy the second prong of
Central Hudson, which requires that the state's asserted interest be
substantial.95 In this case, the Florida Bar asserted an interest "in
protecting the privacy and tranquility of personal injury victims and
their loved ones against intrusive, unsolicited contact by
lawyers., 96 That interest, Justice O'Connor held, is indeed
substantial. 97 In many instances the Supreme Court has concluded
that "[s]tates have a compelling interest in the practice of professions within their boundaries, and . . . as part of their power to
protect the public health, safety and other valid interests, they have
broad power to establish standards for licensing practitioners and
regulating the practice of professions."98 Thus, Justice O'Connor
noted, the Court's precedents "leave no room for doubt that the
protection of potential clients' privacy is a substantial state
interest." 99
Finding the Florida Bar's asserted interest to be substantial, the
Court then proceeded to satisfy the third prong of Central

93Went For It, 115 S.Ct. at 2376; Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
94Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2376.

" Id.; Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 560.
96 Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2376.
97 id.

9' Id.(quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975)
which held that "[tihe interest of the states in regulating lawyers is especially
great since lawyers are essential to the primary government function of
administering justice, and have historically been 'officers of the courts"' and
Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 123-24 (1961) which held that a state's interest
in disciplining lawyers is "incident to their broader responsibility for keeping the
administration of justice and the standards of professional conduct unsullied").
99 Went For It, 115 S.Ct. at 2376 (quoting Edenfeld v. Fane 507 U.S. 761,
768 (1993)). In Edenfeld, the Court held that protecting one's privacy from
unsolicited intrusion was indeed substantial state interest for purpose of Central
Hudson test. 507 U.S. at 768; see also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
477 (1978) (concluding that the bar's interest in protecting the public justified
a regulation on in-person solicitation).
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Hudson. 0° Under Central Hudson, "the state must demonstrate
that the challenged regulation advances the government's interest
in a direct and material way."'' In satisfying this burden, a state
must not only prove that the evils it desires to prevent exist, but
must also show how the proposed regulation will remove the evil
"to a material degree."'0 2 In support of its view that a ban on
attorney direct-mail solicitation advances a substantial governmental
interest, the Florida Bar proffered the results of a two year attorney
advertising and solicitation study." 3 The Court stated that the
Florida Bar's summary, noteworthy for its breadth and detail,
'oo Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2377.
101Id; Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.

v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.

557, 566 (1980).
102 Went For it, 115 S. Ct. at 2377 (quoting Edenfeld, 507 U.S. 761, 769).

Id. at 2377. The two-year study conducted by Magid Associates revealed
that "[a]s of June 1989, lawyers mailed 700,000 direct solicitations in Florida
annually, 40% of which were [targeted at personal injury] victims or their
survivors." Id. In addition, the survey showed that "54% of the general
population surveyed said that contacting personal injury victims was a violation
of privacy." Id. Included in the study was a random sampling of persons who
received direct-mail advertising from lawyers in 1987. The survey shows that
45% believed that direct-mail solicitation is "designed to take advantage of
gullible or unstable people;" 34% found such tactics "annoying or irritating;"
26% found it "an invasion of your privacy;" and 24% reported that it "made you
angry." Id.
The study also includes "excerpts from complaints of direct-mail recipients.
For example, a Florida citizen described how he was appalled and angered by the
brazen attempt of a law firm to solicit him by letter shortly after he was injured
and his fiance was killed in an auto accident." Id. at 2377-78. Another Florida
citizen, whose mother received a direct mail solicitation letter just three days
after his father's funeral, found the letter to be "despicable and inexcusable." Id.
at 2378. Another person whose nephew's family received a direct-mail
solicitation just one day after their son's funeral described the letter as "beyond
comprehension." Id. Finally, the survey presented a letter written by a recipient
of a direct mailing to the attorney who sent the letter. The citizen wrote, "I
consider the unsolicited contact from you after my child's accident to be of the
103

rankest form of ambulance chasing and in incredibly poor taste ....

I cannot

begin to express with my limited vocabulary the utter contempt in which I hold
you and your kind." Id.; see also Howard Pankratz, Lawyers' Letters Anger
FloridianThirty Day Waiting PeriodUpheld by High Court, DENv. POST, Aug.

11, 1995, at A 12 (reporting numerous excerpts from complaints of direct-mail
recipients).
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"contains data-both statistical and anecdotal-supporting the Bar's
contentions that the Florida public views direct-mail solicitations in
the immediate wake of accidents as an intrusion on privacy that
reflects poorly upon the [legal] profession. "104
Satisfying this prong of CentralHudson, Justice O'Connor then
explained why the holding in Shapero v Kentucky Bar
Association,10 5 was not binding on Went For It. 11 6 First, in
Shapero the state "did not seek to justify its regulation as a
measure undertaken to prevent lawyers' invasions of privacy
interests. . . . Rather, the state focused exclusively on the special
dangers of overreaching inher[ent] in targeted solicitations."1'0 7 In
contrast, the purpose of the Florida Bar's ban on direct-mail
solicitation is to protect against lawyers' intrusions upon citizens'
personal grief in times of trauma. 08 Second, unlike the Florida
Bar's thirty-day ban, the proposed ban in Shapero had no "time
frame."' 1 9 Finally, in contrast to Went For It, Shapero failed to
proffer any real evidence which revealed a direct harm precipitated
by direct-mail solicitation." 0 Justice O'Connor concluded that
"the Court's perfunctory treatment of privacy in Shapero [is] of
little utility in assessing this ban on targeted solicitation of victims
in the immediate aftermath of accidents.""'
The Court then proceeded to satisfy the last prong of Central
Hudson."2 Under this prong, Central Hudson requires that the
state narrowly draw the commercial speech regulation." 3 In

Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2377.
'o'486 U.S. 466 (1988) (holding that Kentucky rule prohibiting targeted,
104

direct-mail solicitation by attorneys was unconstitutional).
16 Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2378. "Shaperodiffers in several fundamental
respects from the case before us, Justice O'Connor argued." Id.
107 Id.
1o Id. at 2376, 2378.
09 Id. at 2378. In Shapero, Kentucky's restriction on targeted, direct-mail

solicitation was a complete ban on solicitation to any victims of foreclosure.
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association, 486 U.S. 466, 468 (1988).
"o Went For It, 115 S. Ct at 2378.
...Id. at 2379
12 Id. at 2380.
"3 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.

557, 565 (1980).
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Board of Trustees of State University of New York v. Fox,"4 the

Supreme Court determined that there need only be a reasonable "fit
between the [government's] end and the means chosen to accomplish those ends."" 5 On this point, the respondents, John Blakely

114

492 U.S. 469 (1989).

"' Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480
(1989). In Fox, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether state
restrictions on commercial speech are permissible if the restrictions "go beyond
the least restrictive means" needed to promote the states' interests. Id. at 471.
Todd Fox, a student at the State University of New York at Cortland filed a
lawsuit against the State University of New York, arguing that its Resolution 66156 infringed upon his First Amendment right to free speech. Id. at 472-73. Fox
was upset that the University applied Resolution 66-156 to prohibit a representative of American Future Systems from showing the corporation's china, crystal
and silverware in the dormitory. Id.at 472. Resolution 66-156 stated:
No authorization will be given to private commercial enterprises to
operate on State University campuses or in facilities furnished by the
University other than to provide for food, legal beverages, campus
bookstore, vending, linen supply, laundry, dry cleaning, banking,
barber and beautician services and cultural events.
Id. at 471-72 (citing State Univ. of N.Y. Res. 66-156 (1979)).
In determining the constitutionality of Resolution 66-156, the Court applied
the four-prong test established in Central Hudson. Id. at 475. The Court found
that the first prong had been satisfied because the parties stipulated that the
speech was not misleading. Id. As for the second prong, the Court found that the
University indeed had a substantial interest in promoting an educational
atmosphere in the dormitory. Id. The Court left the third prong to the district
court to decide on remand. Id. at 476. The Court focused on the fourth prong of
Central Hudson. Id.
In discussing the fourth prong, the Court considered whether the
University's regulation was more extensive than necessary to serve the asserted
interest in maintaining an educational atmosphere. Id. In deciding this question,
the Court first discussed whether the word "necessary" in the CentralHudson test
should be interpreted strictly to require an application of a least-restrictive means
test or if a more flexible meaning could be applied. Id.at 476-77. A more
flexible interpretation of CentralHudson, the Court held, would only require that
the restrictions be narrowly tailored and no more extensive than is "reasonably
necessary" to directly advance the substantial interest. Id.at 477. In resolving this
conflict, the Court reviewed other tests applied to other speech restrictions, such
as the time, place and manner restriction. Id. The Court explained that in time,
place or manner restrictions we have held that they need not be the least
restrictive alternative because of the heavy burden such a test would impose on
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and Went For It, Inc., argued that the Florida Bar's thirty day
regulation on targeted, direct-mail solicitation was overreaching. 116 By prohibiting the sending of direct-mail solicitation
to all individuals involved in an accident, regardless of the
accident's severity or the injured person's mindset, "the rule keeps
who are ready,
useful information from those accident victims
' 17
advice."
lawyer's
a
utilize
to
able
willing and

the state; rather, the Court will uphold a time, place or manner restriction if it
is narrowly tailored to serve a substantial state interest. Id. at 477-78. In
reasoning that commercial speech warranted the same constitutional protection
afforded to other speech regulated by a time, place or manner restriction, the
Court concluded that it would not require the application of a least restrictive
means test in commercial speech cases because of the heavy burden such a test
imposes. Id. at 477. Rather, in satisfying the fourth prong of CentralHudson, the
Court held it would only require a "reasonable fit" between the state's asserted
interest and the restriction chosen to satisfy that interest. Id. at 480. Finding there
to be a "reasonable fit" between the University's restriction and its substantial
interest in promoting an educational atmosphere in a dormitory, the Court
concluded that the Resolution 66-156 was constitutional. Id. For a further
discussion and in-depth analysis of the decision in Fox, see Lochner, supra note
47, at 1335.
Time, place and manner regulation is another vast issue in First Amendment
jurisprudence and therefore outside the scope of this Comment. Supreme Court
decisions dealing with time, place and manner regulation include: City of Ladue
v. Gilleo, 114 S.Ct. 2038 (1994); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781
(1989); City Council of the City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789 (1984). For an in-depth discussion on time, place and manner
regulation and its application, see Paul G. Chevigny, FirstAmendment: Begging
And The First Amendment: Young v. New York City Transit Authority, 57
BROOK. L. REV. 525 (1991); Ned Greenberg, Mendelsohn v. Meese: A First
Amendment Challenge To The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, 39 AM. U. L. REV.
355 (1990); William B. Harvey, Private Restraint Of Expressive Freedom: A
Post-PruneyardAssessment, 69 B.U. L. REv. 929 (1989); Elena W. Slipp,
Bankruptcy: Loper v. New York City Police Department Begs The Question: Is
Panhandling ProtectedBy The First Amendment, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 587
(1994); David A. Stoll, Comment, Public Forum DoctrineCrashes At Kennedy
Airport Injuring Nine: International Society For Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
Lee, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 1271 (1993).
116 Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2380.
117 Id.
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Not persuaded by respondents' claim as to the ban's overinclusivity, the majority stated,' "We find little deficiency in the
ban's failure to distinguish among injured Floridians by the severity
of their pain or the intensity of their grief.""' 9 The Court declared
that the ban is "reasonably well tailored to its stated objective of
eliminating targeted mailings whose type and timing are a source
of distress to Floridians [and is] narrow both in scope and duration. '' 2 The ban also leaves open "ample alternative channels for
receipt of information about the availability of legal representation,"'' including advertisements on billboards, television, radio
and in the yellow pages. 22 The Court therefore concluded that
because Florida's thirty-day ban on direct-mail solicitation of
personal injury victims or their family members passes the Central
23
Hudson test, the rule does not violate of the First Amendment.
C. Justice Anthony M Kennedy Dissenting Opinion
In leading the dissent, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy argued that
"[a]ttorneys who communicate their willingness to assist potential
clients are engaged in speech protected by the First
Amendment"'124 for nearly two decades under the principle
established in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona. 25 Although this

118

Id.

119 Id.
120

Id. at 2380-8 1.

121

Id
Id. at 2380. Rule 4-7.2(a) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar

122

provides:
A lawyer may advertise services through public media, such as a
telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or other periodical,
billboards and other signs, radio, television, and recorded messages the
public may access by dialing a telephone number, or through written
communication not involving solicitation as defined in rule 4-7.4.
Id. at 2380-81; The Florida Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the
Florida Bar-Advertising Issues, 571 So.2d 451, 461 (Fla. 1990).
123 Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2381.
124 Id. at 2381 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
125 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (reversing an Arizona disciplinary rule that
prohibited attorney advertising). Since Bates, the Supreme Court has found most
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protection is limited and subject to the intermediate scrutiny
framework set forth in Central Hudson,126 Justice Kennedy
vigorously disagreed with the majority that the Florida Bar's27 ban
on direct-mail solicitation satisfied the Central Hudson test. 1 12
The holding in Shapero v Kentucky Bar Association, 1
Justice Kennedy argued, prevents the Court from finding a
substantial state interest in this case. 129 In Shapero, the Court
found that the dangers presented by in-person solicitation, such as
"overreaching and undue influence," did not exist in direct-mail
solicitation. 30 The Court reasoned that "[a] letter ... (unlike a
lawyer), can readily be put in a drawer to be considered later,

communications by attorneys to be neither false nor misleading and therefore
protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Peel v. Attorney Registration &
Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 110 (1990) (holding that advertising
one's certification by National Board of Trial Advocacy was not actually or
inherently misleading); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the
Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (holding illustrations or pictures
in advertisements not inherently misleading); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 205
(1982) (listing jurisdictions in which lawyer is admitted to practice not inherently
misleading).
The Court, however, has found some types of advertising by lawyers
misleading. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652-53 (holding statement that "no fee
will be charged unless recovery" is misleading, unless it informs clients of
liability for costs and expenses of litigation); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 205
(listing lawyers as members of U.S. Supreme Court Bar "in large capital letters"
might be misleading to general public unfamiliar with admission requirements).
126 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557 (1980).
127 Went For It, 115 S.Ct. at 2382 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
12 486 U.S. at 475. The Court held that a state may not categorically
prohibit targeted, direct-mail solicitation by lawyers. The Court emphasized that
the relevant inquiry in determining the propriety of a particular direct-mail
solicitation does not involve examining "whether there exist potential clients
whose condition makes them susceptible to undue influence, but whether the
mode of communication poses a serious danger that lawyers will exploit any such
susceptibility." Id. at 474. Employing this test, the Court declared that written
forms of communication, such as direct-mail solicitation poses no such danger
and are thus protected by the First Amendment. Id.at 475.
29 Went For It, 115 S.Ct. at 2382 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
130 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S.
466, 475 (1988).
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ignored, or be discarded."'' The Shapero Court concluded that
for
direct mail solicitation does not present the same justification
13 2
cases.
solicitation
in-person
as
restriction of speech
Justice Kennedy further argued that even were the state's
asserted interests substantial, the Florida Bar's thirty-day ban fails
the third part of the Central Hudson test which "requires that the
dangers the state seeks to eliminate be real and that the speech
restriction advance the asserted state interest in a direct and
material way."' 3 3 Justice Kennedy found the Florida Bar's twoyear study to be inadequate to show harm, and argued that the
study "includes no actual surveys, few indications of sample size
or selection procedures, no explanations of methodology and no
discussion of excluded results."' 3 a Justice Kennedy further noted
that the study for the most part dealt "with television advertising
1 35
and phone book listings, and not direct-mail solicitations.'
Finally, Justice Kennedy argued that the Florida thirty-day ban
fails the last part of the Central Hudson test, which requires that
the speech restriction be "reasonably fit" to the asserted state
interest.'36 First, the ban applies to all types of injuries, regardless
of their severity.'37 Second, there is simply no logical reason for
the Court to believe that "in all or most cases an attorney's advice
would be unwelcome or unnecessary" within thirty days of an
injury. 138 Justice Kennedy concluded that the Court's decision "is
a serious departure, not only from [the Court's] prior decisions
principles that
involving attorney advertising, but also from the
' 39
govern the transmission of commercial speech."'
31 Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2382 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Shapero, 486
U.S. at 475.
132 Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2382 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 2383-84 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
114 Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2384 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
' Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
136 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
' Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2384-85 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
131 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
139 Id. at 2386 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433
U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (reversing Arizona disciplinary rule that prohibited attorney
advertising); see also Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n,
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III. A STEP IN THE WRONG DIRECTION
In FloridaBar v Went For It, Inc., the Court weighed the right
of Florida citizens to personal privacy in times of grief with the
First Amendment right of attorneys to advertise their services and
the interests of clients to receive this information. Relying on a
Florida Bar two-year survey on the effects of lawyer advertising,
the Court concluded that protecting the privacy of personal injury
victims or their families from unsolicited contact by attorneys is a
substantial state interest, and thus outweighed an attorney's First
Amendment right to commercial advertising. 140 As a result, the
Court upheld as constitutional a Florida Bar rule prohibiting
personal injury lawyers or referral services "from sending targeted,
direct-mail solicitations to victims or their relatives for thirty days
following an accident or disaster. ''1 4 ' The remainder of this
Comment will analyze the legal impact of this decision which
recognized the vulnerable-audience theory as a substantial state
interest, and how the overall decision of the Court, which permitted
a thirty-day ban on direct-mail solicitation, will affect attorneys and
the general public in the near future.

496 U.S. 91, 99-103 (1990) (using Bates analysis to determine that a state may
not prohibit attorneys from advertising special certifications on letterhead if
information is truthful and not deceptive); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486
U.S. 466, 475 (1988) (holding that Kentucky rule prohibiting targeted, directmail solicitation by attorneys was unconstitutional); Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Council of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 647 (1985)
(holding that it is unconstitutional for a state to prohibit illustrations in
newspaper advertising to intrauterine device users); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191,
203 (1982) (striking down state regulation on advertisements that were not
misleading). But see Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978)
(holding state may place regulations on in-person solicitation).
140 Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2374, 2381.
141Id. at 2384; see also supra note 83 and accompanying text (describing
Rule 4-7.4(b)(1) and Rule 4-7.8(a)).
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A.

The Legal Impact of FloridaBar v Went For It, Inc.

1. Florida Bar Vulnerable-Audience Theory Attacks
Doctrine of Stare Decisis
Underlying the Florida Bar's thirty-day ban is the theory that
the state has "a substantial interest in protecting the personal
privacy and tranquility of [personal] injury victims and their loved
142
ones against intrusive, unsolicited contact by lawyers.'
However, as noted by the dissent, the Court has consistently
rejected this vulnerable audience argument in the past. 43 In
Shapero v Kentucky Bar Association,144 the Court held that
commercial speech cannot be restricted where the government
145
simply believes certain consumers cannot handle the message.
In Shapero, the Court established that in cases which assess
whether attorneys' targeted direct-mail solicitations are entitled to
constitutional protection, courts are not to ask whether an attorney
has sent communications to individuals "whose 'condition' makes
them susceptible to undue influence.' 46 Instead, in passing
judgment on whether the First Amendment protects a certain
communication, courts must inquire "whether the mode of
communication poses a serious danger that lawyers will exploit any
such susceptibility.' 4 4 Employing this test, the Court in Shapero

142

Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2376.

141 Id. at 2381 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing cases rejecting the vulnerable audience argument). For
a further discussion on Shapero and the rejection of the vulnerable audience
argument, see generally Ballantine, supra note 64, at 132-35; The Last Taboo,
supra note 63, at 3; Laroe, supra note 24, at 1530-34.
144 486 U.S. 466, 474 (1988).
145 Shapero, 486 U.S. at 474; see also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 648 (1985). In striking
down the ban on attorney advertising, the Court in Zaudererheld that "the mere
possibility that some members of the population might find advertising offensive
cannot justify suppressing it." Id.
146

Shapero, 486 U.S. at 474.

147Id.
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declared that written forms of communication, such as targeted
direct-mail solicitation, pose no such danger and are protected by
the First Amendment.14 Thus, following precedence, the Court
in Went for It should have rejected the Florida Bar's vulnerable
audience argument as a substantial state interest.
Furthermore, even assuming that the Florida Bar has correctly
gauged the emotional state of the recipients, the Court should have
rejected the state's argument of intrusion, for the Florida rules
contain a provision which effectively addresses that problem.'49
According to Rule 4-7.4(b)(2)(A), the envelope and each page of
all lawyer solicitation letters must bear a statement in red ink
advising the recipient that the letter is an advertisement. 5 ' Once
forewarned, the only recipient who will be exposed to the contents
of the solicitation letters are those who take the affirmative step of
opening the letter and reading its contents. No one is compelled to
do so, as the Court noted in Shapero, those who do not want to be
troubled by such advertisements can readily discard them
unopened."' Thus, there is no reason to require a thirty-day ban
Id. But see The Last Taboo, supra note 63, at 3 (reporting consumer
complaints immediately increased after Florida allowed targeted direct-mail
solicitation); Kathy Sawyer, Lawyers Compound Disaster Grief"Complaints of
Ambulance-ChasingAfterDallasJet Crash Probed,WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1985,
at A14 (reporting that families of Delta Air Lines plane crash victims were
"resentful of being solicited by lawyers").
149 See The Florida Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Florida
Bar-Advertising Issues, 571 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1990). Rule 4-7.4(b)(2)(A) states
as follows:
(2) Written communications to prospective clients for the purpose of
obtaining professional employment are subject to the following
requirements:
(A) Each page of such written communications shall be plainly marked
"advertisement" in red ink, and the lower left comer of the face of the
envelope containing a written communication likewise shall carry a
prominent, red "advertisement" mark. If the written communication is
in the form of a self-mailing brochure or pamphlet, the "advertisement"
mark in red shall appear on the address panel of-the brochure or
pamphlet ....
Id. at 467.
150 Id.
' Shapero, 486 U.S. at 476.
141
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to protect the personal privacy of victims when there are other
existing regulations, such as the red ink label addressing, which
accomplishes the same desired result." 2
2. Florida Bar Vulnerable Audience Theory Poses a
Danger to Commercial Speech Doctrine
The general rule with respect to commercial speech "is that the
speaker and the audience, not the government, assess the value of
the information presented."'5 Even if a particular commercial
message is offensive to some adults, that does not empower the
government to deprive commercial speakers of their right to
communicate with other adults through truthful, nonmisleading

152 See Andrew Blum, Red-Letter Days, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 21, 1989, at 6
(reporting that Arizona responded to the Shapero ruling which prohibited a ban
on direct-mail solicitation by passing an "emergency" rule requiring "advertising
material" to be written in red ink on the envelope and the first page of the

letter); see also LOUISE L. HILL, LAWYER ADVERTISING 114-17 (1990). Hill lists

various states' approachesto labeling requirements on written advertisements. For
example, Arkansas requires all written communications to be marked "advertising." Id. at 115. Arizona requires that "written communications to persons
known to need legal services must be clearly marked on envelope and first page
of communication, in all capital letters, in red ink, in type size at least double the
largest type size used in body of communication 'ADVERTISING MATERIAL:
THIS IS A COMMERCIAL SOLICITATION."' Id. Illinois requires "letters or
advertising circulars and their envelopes to be plainly labeled as advertising
material." Id.Kentucky requires "written or recorded communications to contain
the words 'THIS IS AN ADVERTISEMENT,' in writing to be prominently
displayed in type at least as large as the type in body of the letter and the
envelope must also contain word 'ADVERTISEMENT' in print at least as large
as the name of addressee." Id. New Jersey requires the "word 'ADVERTISEMENT' to be prominently displayed in capital letters at top of first page of
text." Id.at 116.
' Edenfeld v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993). See infra note 172
(discussing Edenfeld).
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speech.54 This principle has been applied to attorney advertising
cases 155 as well as to other general advertising cases.56
For example, in Zauderer v.Office of Disciplinary Council of
Supreme Court of Ohio,'57 an attorney advertising case, the Court
struck down a state disciplinary rule that prevented attorneys from
placing newspaper advertisements advising target portions of the
public of their rights to pursue particular types of cases.' 58 The
Court held that "the mere possibility that some members of the
population might find advertising ... offensive cannot justify
suppressing it."' 5 9

Furthermore, in Bolger v Youngs Drug Products Corp.,6' a
general advertising case, the Court struck down a ban on mail
advertisements for contraceptives. 6 ' The Court found that a

'i4 Shapero, 486 U.S. at 474 (1988); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 648 (1985); Bolger v.
Young Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 (1983); Central Hudson Gas &
Electric v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 573-75 (1980) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (holding that
offensive speech is nonetheless protected by the First Amendment for those
offended can avoid such speech by simply "averting their eyes").
"' Shapero, 486 U.S. at 474; Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 648.
156 Bolger, 463 U.S. at 71; Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 573-75 (Blackmun,
J.,concurring).
"' 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
158 Id. at 648; see supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing
Zauderer).
9 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 648.
160

463 U.S. 60 (1983).

Id. at 75. In Bolger, the Supreme Court reviewed a federal statute that
"prohibit[ed] the mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives." Id.
at 61-62. Title 39 U.S.C. § 3001(e)(2) states that "any unsolicited advertisement
of matter which is designed, adapted, or intended for preventing contraception
is nonmailable matter, shall not be carried or delivered by mail and shall be
disposed of as the Postal Service directs. . . ." Id.at 61 (citing 39 U.S.C.
§ 3001(e)(2) (1994)). In this case, Youngs Corporation attempted to send an
unsolicited mass mailing of informational pamphlets through the mail. Id at 6263. The post office discovered the plan and informed Youngs that the proposed
mailing violated a federal statute. Id.at 63. As a result, Youngs filed for
declaratory and injunctive relief claiming that the federal statute violated the First
Amendment. Id.Finding Youngs' proposed mailing to be commercial speech, the
Court decided to use the framework set forth in CentralHudson in determining
161
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federal statute designed to protect people from mail that they might
find offensive furthered an interest of "little weight.' ' 162 The
Court noted that "the fact that protected speech may be offensive
to some [adults] does not justify its suppression.' ' 163 Thus, just as
the statute's constitutionality. Id. at 68.
The Court first analyzed whether the governmental interests were
substantial. Id. at 70. The government claimed two interests: the statute protected
the recipients from material that "they were likely to find offensive," and the
statute assisted "parents' efforts to control the manner in which their children
became informed about sensitive and important subjects such as birth control."
Id. at 71. The Court rejected the first interest, stating that "offensiveness was
classically not [a] justificatio[n] validating the suppression of expression
protected by the First Amendment.. . . [W]e have consistently held that the fact
that protected speech may be offensive to some does not justify its suppression."
Id. (quoting Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 680 (1977)). The
Court, however, found substantial the second interest in aiding parents' control
over their children's access to information regarding birth control. Id. at 73.
Despite this finding, the Court struck down the federal statute as unconstitutional
for it failed the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test. Id; see also
supra note 45-46 (discussing the four-prong test of CentralHudson).
162 Bolger, 463 U.S. at 71.
163 Id. (citing Carey, 431 U.S. at 701); see also Central Hudson Gas &
Electric v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 573-75 (1980) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (arguing that absent coercion, deception, or misinformation, a state
should not be able to prohibit speech simply because of the persuasive effect the
message may have on the public); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971).
In Cohen, the Supreme Court considered whether a state statute can punish
the wearer of a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft." Cohen, 403 U.S. at
16. Defendant, Paul R. Cohen, was observed wearing such a jacket in front of
the Los Angeles County Courthouse. Id. Cohen was arrested and convicted of
violating § 415 of the California Penal Code which restricts "maliciously and
willfully disturbing the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person ... by...
offensive conduct . . . ." Id. (quoting CAL. PEN. CODE § 415 (1970)). This
conviction was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Id. at 17. Cohen
eventually appealed his case before the U.S. Supreme Court, claiming that the
California statute violated his First Amendment right to free speech. Id. In a
classic opinion led by Justice Harlan, the Court reversed Cohen's conviction on
First Amendment grounds. Id. In doing so, Justice Harlan rejected a number of
arguments advanced by the state. Id. at 17-24. For example, Justice Harlan
rejected the argument that the words on the jacket were obscene. Id. at 20.
Justice Harlan argued that an expression is obscene only if it is "in some
significant way erotic."Id. No erotic "psychic stimulation" could reasonably have
been expected to result in anyone reading Cohen's jacket, Justice Harlan
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the First Amendment puts faith in individual Americans to
determine the value of protected speech, and not the government or
legislatures, 164 so too must American citizens assume
responsibility for accepting, rejecting or simply disregarding such
speech without a government filter.'65
3. Florida Bar's Thirty-Day Regulation on Direct-Mail
Solicitation Promotes Future Underinclusive State
Regulations
The Supreme Court has held that underinclusive regulation in
the First Amendment area "may diminish the credibility of the
government's rational for restricting speech in the first place.' 6 6
concluded. Id. Justice Harlan also rejected the state's argument that Cohen's
message had been "thrust upon unwilling or unsuspected viewers," and that a
state had the power to protect such captive audience from such offensive
language. Id.at 21. Justice Harlan reasoned that "[t]hose in the Los Angeles
courthouse could effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities
simply by averting their eyes." Id. Justice Harlan concluded that a person may
not be punished merely because the statements uttered are profane and therefore
offensive to the listeners. Id. For a further discussion of Cohen, see generally
John Donovan, UnconstitutionalMotivation Analysis and the FirstAmendment:
The FurtherDemise of a Wise and Ancient Doctrine, 33 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
271 (1983); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Marjorie L. Esterow, Censoring
Indecent Cable Programs: The New Morality Meets The New Media, 51
FORDHAM L. REv. 606 (1983); Dianne L. Zimmerman, Requiem For A
Heavyweight: A FarewellTo Warren and Brandeis'sPrivacy Tort, 68 CORNELL
L. REV. 291 (1983).
164 Edenfeld v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993). The Court
noted that:
The commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our social and
cultural life, provides a forum where ideas and information flourish.
Some of the ideas are vital, some of slight worth. But the general rule
is that the speaker and the audience, not the government, assess the
value of the information presented. Thus, even a communication that
does no more than propose a commercial transaction is entitled to the
coverage of the First Amendment.
Id; see infra note 172 (discussing Edenfeld).
165 See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 475-76 (1988).
166 City of LaDue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2044 (1994) (holding that the
underinclusiveness of any statute designed to restrict speech raises serious doubts
whether the state is serving the interests that it claims are furthered by the
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According to the Florida Bar, the mailing ban was enacted to
protect the personal privacy of its citizens from "intrusive,
unsolicited contact" by attorneys in times of trauma.' 67 However,
a thirty-day ban such as Florida's is underinclusive because it

statute).
In Gilleo, the Supreme Court held that a city ordinance which prohibited a
display of certain non-excluded residential signs violated a homeowner's right to
free speech under the First Amendment. Id. at 2047. The City of Ladue's
ordinance prohibited "homeowners from displaying any signs on their property
except 'residence identification' signs, 'for sale' signs and signs warning of
safety hazards." Id. at 2040. The respondent, Margaret P. Gilleo, placed a large
sign on her yard which read "'[S]ay No to the War in the Persian Gulf, Call
Congress Now."' Id. When Gilleo reported to the police that her sign was found
missing on one occasion and knocked down on another, she was advised by them
that the sign violated the City of Ladue's ordinance and was prohibited. Id. The
district court found the ordinance unconstitutional and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 2041; Gilleo v. City of Ladue,
986 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1993).
The United States Supreme Cburt affirmed the Eighth Circuit's decision and
found the ordinance unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that the municipal
regulations affecting speech may invite constitutional challenges either because
they restrict too little speech or because they prohibit too much protected speech.
Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. at 2043. By forbidding residents from displaying virtually
every type of residential sign on their property, the city "has almost completely
foreclosed a venerable means of communication that is both unique and
important" and which "reflects and animates change in the life of a community.
...
Residential signs are an unusually cheap and convenient form of communication. Especially for persons of modest means or limited mobility, a yard or
window sign may have no practical substitute." Id. at 2045. Even though the
city's ordinance may be content-neutral, and even assuming that the ordinance
is narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest because it
infringes on the residents' free speech right, the ordinance is nonetheless
unconstitutional. Id. at 2047.
For a further discussion on Gilleo, see Anthony J. Durone & Melissa K.
Smith, The First Amendment & Private Property:A Sign For Free Speech, 60
Mo. L. REV. 415 (1995); Charles W. Hemingway, A Closer Look At Waters v.
Churchill & United States v. National Treasury Employees Union: Constitutional
Tensions Between The Government As Employer And Citizen As Federal
Employee, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 2231 (1995); George G. Size & Glenn R. Britton,
Is There Hate Speech?: R.A.V. & Mitchell In The Context Of First Amendment
Jurisprudence,21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 913 (1995).
167 Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
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operates only to restrict those lawyers seeking to represent the
accident victims or their families. 6 It does not forbid contact by
insurance adjusters and defense lawyers who remain free to make
in-person visits and telephone calls, and to send letters to recent
accident victims or their families in an effort to settle the victim's
claims.169 The ban does little to insulate accident victims and
their families from unwelcome intrusions. Instead, the ban prevents
victims from receiving information regarding the obtainability of
legal counsel at a time when it is most urgently needed 7 -when
they are encircled by representatives of potential defendants urging
17
the victims to settle or waive their claims.'

16'

Robert A. Clifford, ABA Needs More Than PR To Polish TarnishedLegal

Image, CHI. LAW., Aug. 1995, at 15 (arguing that the Florida rule is under-

inclusive for it only applies to plaintiff attorneys and not to opposing insurance
companies or defense counsel).
169 See David G. Savage, Supreme Court Upholds Lawyer
SolicitationCurbs
Law, L.A. TIMES, June 22, 1995, at A4 (quoting criticism regarding the double
standard of the Florida rule); see also Stephen Chapman, When PublicIgnorance
is Goodfor Lawyers, CHI. TRIB., June 25, 1995, at C3 (reporting on how "[a]
lawyer who wants to sue on behalf of the victim may not contact the victim," yet
a lawyer for the defendant or insurance company "is free to contact the victim").
170 McHenry v. Florida Bar, 21 F.3d 1038, 1043 n.12 (11th Cir. 1994). The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals cited Justice Leander Shaw of the Florida
Supreme Court who argued, in opposition to the Florida Bar's proposed thirtyday ban on targeted, direct-mail solicitation, that:
This ban will effectively deprive many accident victims o information
concerning the availability of professional legal assistance precisely
when they need it most-during the initial period following a serious
accident when they are confronted with an unintelligible legal tangle
and demands to waive or compromise their rights. It is during this time
that informed decisionmaking is crucial.
Id. (quoting The Florida Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Florida
Bar-Advertising Issues, 571 So.2d 451, 474 (Fla. 1990) (Shaw, C.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part)).
171For instance, immediately following the crash of a Pan Am jetliner near
New Orleans, Louisiana in 1982, agents from the airline's insurance company
began visiting and mailing letters to the victims' families in an effort to settle
their claims. John Spelich, Air Disasters Pit Insurers Against Lawyers, DET.
FREE PREss, Aug. 18, 1987, at 12B. Similar measures were taken by insurance
carriers after other airline disasters. Two days after "nine people died and 13
were injured in the crash of Northwest Airline Flight 2268," the United States
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Indeed, the highly selective nature of the coverage of the thirtyday ban raises serious questions as to whether Florida's asserted
interests are furthered by the ban on targeted direct-mailing by
attorneys. It is incomprehensible that the Florida Bar Association
believes that, on the one hand, the receipt of a clearly marked
solicitation letter from a lawyer is a gross invasion of privacy,
while, on the other hand, a barrage of visits, telephone calls and
letters from potential defendants and their representatives is not an
invasion of privacy. Making matters worse, the only way that an
accident victim can effectively be insulated from the flood of
defense entreaties is to retain an attorney. Yet the Florida rule
complicates that process by severing the flow of information
regarding the availability of legal counsel when the accident victim
is most in need.
4. FloridaBar S Thirty-Day Regulation on Direct-Mail
Solicitation also Promotes Overinclusive State Regulation
If a restriction on speech is overinclusive because it bans speech
outside the scope of its purported purpose, then the restriction is
unconstitutional.' 72 The Florida Bar's thirty-day ban is
Aviation Underwriters Inc. set up an office at a local airport hotel to settle
insurance claims. John Saunders & Jack Kresnak, Putting a Price Tag on
Life-Insurers Talk with Crash Victims' Families, DET. FREE PRESS, Mar. 7,
1987, at IA.
172 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 570-72 (1980); Edenfeld v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993) (concerning
restrictions on commercial speech, the Court stated that the precision of any
commercial speech regulation "must be the touchstone in an area so closely
touching our most precious freedoms"). In Edenfeld, the United States Supreme
Court assessed the constitutionality of a Florida statute which restricted certified
public accountants ("CPAs") from in-person solicitation of potential clients. Id.
at 765. In 1985, Scott Fane moved from New Jersey to Florida to begin an
accounting practice. Id. Fane planned to solicit clients by communicating in
person with businesses he thought may be in need of his services. Id. However,
the Board of Accountancy had a rule which restricted in-person solicitation by
CPAs, and thus prevented Fane from carrying out his plan. Id. The Board's rule
provided that a CPA "shall not by any direct, in-person, uninvited solicitation
solicit an engagement to perform public accounting services ... where the
engagement would be for a person or entity not already a client of [the CPA],
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overinclusive because it prohibits written communications to all
types of accident or personal injury victims, regardless of their state
of mind.' 73 It keeps useful information from those accident
victims who are ready, willing and able to utilize a lawyer's advice,
and who are unlikely to be particularly upset by a lawyer's
solicitation letters.' 7 4 As stated by the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals when it determined that the Florida Bar's thirty-day ban
was unconstitutional:
We note that, although all the potential clients in Shapero
faced legal difficulties of the same magnitude (a foreclosure suit), some of the same potential clients targeted by
Appellees in this case will suffer from relatively minor

unless such person or entity has invited such a communication." Id. (citing FLA.
ADMIN. CODE § 21A-24.002(2)(c) (1992)).
Fane initiated a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida, contending that the Florida restriction on in-person
solicitation by CPAs was unconstitutional because it violated their First
Amendment right to free speech. Id. at 766. Fane argued that the restriction
neither directly advanced the asserted state's interest in policing the accounting
profession nor was the statute narrowly tailored. Id. The Board, on the other
hand, contended that the statute was constitutional because it was needed to
protect the independence and objectivity of the accounting profession. Id. The
district court rejected the Board's argument and enjoined enforcement of the
Florida rule prohibiting in-person solicitation by accountants. Id. After the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, the Board appealed to
the Supreme Court. Id.
In determining the constitutionality of the Florida rule, the Supreme Court
proceeded to use the test set fourth in CentralHudson. The Court concluded that
although the Board's asserted interests in "protecting consumers from fraud or
overreaching" and protecting the professionalism of accountants are substantial,
the Board had failed to demonstrate how its ban on in-person solicitation
advances those interests. Id. at 768-70. The Court reasoned that the Board
presented "no studies that suggest personal solicitation of prospective business
clients by CPAs creates the dangers of fraud, overreaching, or compromised
independence that the Board claimed to fear." Id. at 769. Moreover, the Court
observed that the record did not disclose any anecdotal evidence either from
Florida or another state that validated the Board's supposition. Id. Thus, the
Court affirmed the prior decisions and found the Florida rule banning in-person
solicitation by accountants unconstitutional. Id. at 773.
17' Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S.Ct. 2371, 2384
(1995).
174 Id. at 2385.
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injuries, while others no doubt will have injuries that are
more severe. Nevertheless, the [Florida] Bar rule applies
equally to solicitations within thirty days of a simple slip
and fall or of accidents that result in severe injuries or
75
fatalities. 1
Because the Florida Bar's regulation on attorney direct-mail
solicitation is overinclusive, under the test set forth in Central
Hudson,176 the rule should not be deemed constitutional.
B. The Socio-Economic Impact of FloridaBar v
Went For It, Inc.
1. Nonsolicitation Rules DisproportionatelyImpact Small
Law Firms and Solo Practitioners
The Florida Bar's thirty-day ban on direct-mail solicitation, one
of the cheapest means of attracting clients, will disproportionately
impact small firms and solo practitioners relative to the more
established lawyers. 177 In his concurring opinion in Ohralik v
Ohio State Bar Association, 78 Justice Thurgood Marshall stated:
The impact of the nonsolicitation rules, . . . is discriminatory with respect to the suppliers as well as the consumers of legal services. Just as the persons who suffer most
from lack of knowledge about lawyers' availability belong
to the less privileged classes of society, so the Disciplinary
Rules against solicitation fall most heavily on those
McHenry v. Florida Bar, 21 F.3d 1038, 1043 n.9 (11th Cir. 1994).
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 570-72 (1980).
177 See Laroe, supra note 24, at 1544 (reporting how regulating direct-mail
171

176

solicitation mostly impacts lawyers in small firms and solo practitioners);
Ringleb, supra note 25, at 1235 n.238 (citing studies which show that most
advertising lawyers are younger and in small law firms or are solo practitioners);
Linda Greenhouse, At the Bar, N.Y. TIMEs, June 23, 1995, at A23. Greenhouse
argues that the Florida Bar's restriction will create a divide between those
lawyers practicing in large firms for wealthy clients and those lawyers making
a living representing ordinary people in personal injury cases. Id.
178 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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attorneys engaged in a single-practitioner or small-partnership form of practice-attorneys who typically earn less than
their fellow
practitioners in larger, corporate oriented
9
7

firms. 1

Small firms and solo practitioners lack the reputation, connections
or funds that allow more established firms and lawyers to attract
business without direct-mail advertising.' The fact that such
lawyers are motivated by a desire to earn a living does not reduce
their entitlement to First Amendment protection. As courts continue
to uphold nonsolicitation regulations, such as the Florida Bar's, it
is likely that bans on targeted, direct-mailing will significantly
impair small firms and solo practitioners.
2. Nonsolicitation Rules Deprives Low-and ModerateIncome Familiesfrom Obtaining Valuable Information
Regarding Legal Services
Nearly twenty years ago, in Bates v State Bar of Arizona, the
Court predicted that establishing First Amendment protection for
attorney advertising would "effect profound changes in the practice
of law.""' The Court premised its analysis not only on the
general understanding that advertising is valuable because it
informs the public about the obtainability and cost of legal
services,"' but also on the fact that the then existing methods of
attracting clients failed "to reach out and serve the [entire]
community."'8 3 Citing studies which revealed that many people
who needed legal help were discouraged from obtaining it out of
Id. at 475 (Marshall, J., concurring).
"0 See Laroe, supra note 24, at 1544 (reporting that lawyers in small firms
179

and solo practitioners are mostly affected by regulations on direct-mail
solicitation "for they cannot afford other sources of advertising, such as television
and newspaper advertising"); A ProtectedBar, NAT'L L.J., July 3, 1995, at A20
(reporting that the Florida rule will create a split between large firms and small
personal injury firms).
'8 433 U.S. 350, 389 (Powell, J., concurring).
1S2 Id
at 364; Lauren Dobrowalski, Maintaining the Dignity of the
Profession:An InternationalPerspectiveon Legal Advertising and Solicitation,
12 DICK. J. INT'L L. 367, 368 (1994).
183 Bates, 433 U.S. at 370.
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an exaggerated fear of the cost or because of inexperience locating
a competent attorney,'84 the Court concluded that advertising "can
that a consumer needs to make an
provide some of the information
'' 5
intelligent selection. 8
Analyzing the Court's prediction today, the Court was right. On
balance, the protection established in Bates regarding attorney
advertising has improved our justice system. Studies undertaken
since Bates reveal that although the problems identified by the
Court in Bates regarding the general public's access to legal
services remain valid today,'86 advertising appears to have ameliorated them. 87 Surveys across income levels reveal 88a greater access
to legal services today than during the Bates era.
An America Bar Association ("ABA") sponsored study
conducted in 1974 and 1989, illustrates that a higher percentage of
adults used lawyers twelve years after Bates than they did three

184

Id. at 371 n. 22-23; see supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing

various studies which indicate that many people avoid contacting an attorney in
time of need for they do not know how to locate a competent attorney to handle
their particular legal problem).
185 Bates, 433 U.S. at 371.
186 COMPREHENSIVE NEEDS STUDY, supranote 6, at 25. A study conducted
as recently as 1992 by the American Bar Association found that 40% of lowincome families and 36% of moderate-income families took no direct action to
solve their legal needs either because they were unaware of the legal problem or
because they thought nothing could be done about it. COMPREHENSIVE NEEDS
STUDY, supra note 6, at 25; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text
(reporting other studies suggesting that the majority of the public avoid
contacting an attorney in time of need).
187 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council of the Supreme Court of Ohio,
471 U.S. 626, 634 (1985) (stating that witnesses testified that "they would not
have learned of their legal claims had it not been for the [attorney's] advertisement"); Linda Morton, Finding a Suitable Lawyer: Why Consumers Can't
Always Get What They Want and What the Legal Profession Should Do About
It, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283, 290 (1992) (citing a study conducted by three
professors which reveal that one way to reach poor people is through advertising
of legal services); see supra note 6 and accompanying text (reporting how
advertising has helped the general public gain access to legal services). But see
Ringleb, supra note 25, at 1244 (concluding that choice of attorney is relatively
uninfluenced by direct-mail).
188 See CURRAN, supra note 6, at 57.
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years before the decision.189 Among the reasons listed by the
ABA for this dramatic increase was the relaxation by the courts on
rules against advertising. 9 ° In fact, an ABA Comprehensive
Needs Study conducted in 1992 found that thirty-one percent of
low-income households and fifteen percent of moderate-income
households who hired an attorney found the attorney either through
an advertisement or an attorney referral service.' 9' Thus, placing
regulations on attorney advertising, such as the Florida Bar's thirtyday ban on direct-mail solicitation by personal injury lawyers or
referral services, will effectively deprive the low- and moderateincome families from obtaining legal counsel as well as discourage
such families from turning to the justice system to help solve their
legal matters.
3. Nonsolicitation Rules Impact on the Cost of Legal
Services
Attorney advertising not only provides information about legal
services to lower income households, but it also reduces legal fees;
thereby providing greater access to these households.' 92 A 1984
189See CURRAN, supra note 6, at 57.
190See ANDREWS, supra note 6, at 85

(reporting that relaxing the rules on

advertising "helps the average citizen gain access to legal services"); CURRAN,
supra note 6, at 61 (reporting that relaxing the rules on attorney advertising is
one reason for the dramatic increase in the public's use of legal services); see
also Larry Bodine, AdvertisingAcumen, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 13, 1990, at 9 (stating
that "if honest and accurate lawyer advertising were allowed to flourish, and the
stifling restrictions were trimmed away, the public would get a better understanding of their rights and the court system").
191 COMPREHENSIVE NEEDS STUDY, supra note 6, at 28.
192 See Calvani et al., Attorney Advertising and Competition at the Bar, 41
VAND. L. REv. 761, 776-78 (1988). Economic theorists Terry Calvani, James
Langenfeld and Gordon Shuford explain that lifting restraints on lawyer
advertising will enable new firms to compete more readily with established firms.
Id. at 778. The increase in client volume will also enable lawyers to lower their
fees. Id. at 776. They argue that although attorney advertising cannot replace an
attorneys reputation, "advertising can provide useful information to many
consumers at once, which reduces the total cost of providing legal services." Id.;
see also ANDREWS, supra note 6, at 79-82 (noting that advertising encourages
competition among attorneys resulting in increased quality at lower prices);
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Federal Trade Commission's study found that the types of civil
legal services usually needed by low-income households cost five
percent to thirteen percent more in states with restrictive attorney
advertising rules than in states with liberal rules.'93 Researchers
and commentators have concluded that advertising tends to lower
the cost of legal services because it facilitates comparison shopping;.94 increases the overall demand for legal services,1 95 which
enables practitioners to employ economies of scale; and provides
attorneys with less expensive methods of attracting clients.' 96
LAWYER ADVERTISING AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 6, at 129 (discussing
economic benefits of lawyer advertising).
'9' F.T.C. REP., supra note 3, at 79. In 1978, Dr. Steven Cox, a professor
at Arizona State University, conducted a study in Phoenix, Arizona on the price
difference for legal services offered by attorneys who advertise and by attorneys
who did not advertise. F.T.C. REP., supra note 3, at 78. The study revealed that
"on average, attorneys who advertised charged somewhat lower prices than those
who did not." F.T.C. REP., supra note 3, at 78. In 1981, based on the results of
Cox's 1978 study, the F.T.C. decided to conduct a follow-up study with Cox on
the relationship between the state restrictions on advertising and the price of legal
services. F.T.C. REP., supra note 3, at 78-79. The F.T.C. concluded that based
on their investigation, state restrictions on attorney advertising raises the prices
of legal services. According to the F.T.C. study, "attorneys in more restrictive
[advertising] states" charge more "than those in less restrictive [advertising]
states. The fact that more restrictions on advertising are associated with higher
prices, suggests that ...the dominant effect of advertising is to enhance price
competition by lowering consumer search costs." F.T.C. REP., supra note 3, at
79. For various tables outlining the results of the survey, see F.T.C. REP., supra
note 3, at 122-24; see also Calvani et al., supra note 192, at 783 (reporting
findings of the Federal Trade Commission's study); Sawaya, supranote 3, at 88
(reporting on findings of the F.T.C. study).
194 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., Why Lawyers Should Be Allowed to
Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1084, 1099
(1983). The authors of this article discuss the role of advertising in the legal
service market. Id. They argue that there are numerous advantages to legal
advertising. For example, advertising benefits the public by facilitating comparative shopping by "caus[ing] consumers to seek information about the producer's
reputation and about other consumers' direct experience with him." Id.
Furthermore, legal advertising enables the attorney to "reach and recruit a large
number of consumers and thereby to increase revenue." Id.
'95 Hazard et al., supra note 194, at 1098.
196 See ANDREWS, supra note 6 at 79 (relaxing the rules on legal advertising
and solicitation helps reduce the cost of legal services); Calvani et al., supranote
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Advertising, such as direct-mailing, remains a vital tool to most
Americans in providing broad access to legal services at a lower
cost. Advertisements that are truthful and not misleading should
therefore remain free of state regulations.
CONCLUSION

The U.S. Supreme Court, in Florida Bar v Went For It,
InC.,197 concluded that protecting the privacy of personal injury
victims or their families from unsolicited contact by attorneys is a
substantial state interest that outweighs an attorney's First
Amendment right to commercial advertising, and allows a state to
place a waiting period of thirty-days on direct-mail solicitation by
attorneys to personal injury victims or their families. This ruling
creates several problems. For one, it favors large, established firms
and lawyers with money to spend on other forms of expensive
advertising. Small firms and solo practitioners who rely on directmail solicitation as a means of attracting clients are, no doubt,
disproportionately affected by regulations on targeted direct-mail
solicitation. Moreover, placing regulations on lawyer advertising,
such as a thirty-day ban, will have a negative impact on the general
public at large. Legal advertising aids the general public by making
them more aware of legal issues and the availability of legal
services. These factors, and the reality that there are other less
restrictive means of protecting the privacy of recent accident
victims, such as requiring red ink advertising labels on all targeted,
direct-mailings, requires the Court to find regulation on targeted,
direct-mail solicitation unconstitutional.

192, at 776 (commenting on the relationship between attorney advertising and
legal costs).
197 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).

